Emerging Phishing Trends and Effectiveness of the Anti-Phishing Landing
  Page by Gupta, Srishti & Kumaraguru, Ponnurangam
Emerging Phishing Trends and Effectiveness of the
Anti-Phishing Landing Page
Srishti Gupta, Ponnurangam Kumaraguru
Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology, Delhi
Cybersecurity Education and Research Centre (CERC), IIIT-Delhi
{srishtig, pk}@iiitd.ac.in
Abstract—Each month, more attacks are launched with the
aim of making web users believe that they are communicating
with a trusted entity which compels them to share their personal,
financial information. Acquired sensitive information is then
used for personal benefits, like, gain access to money of the
individuals from whom the information was taken. Phishing costs
Internet users billions of dollars every year. A recent report
highlighted phishing loss of around $448 million to organizations
in April 2014. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU)
created an anti-phishing landing page supported by Anti-Phishing
Working Group (APWG) with the aim to train users on how
to prevent themselves from phishing attacks. It is used by
financial institutions, phish site take down vendors, government
organizations, and online merchants. When a potential victim
clicks on a phishing link that has been taken down, he / she is
redirected to the landing page. In this paper, we present the
comparative analysis on two datasets that we obtained from
APWG’s landing page log files; one, from September 7, 2008
- November 11, 2009, and other from January 1, 2014 - April
30, 2014. We found that the landing page has been successful in
training users against phishing. Forty six percent users clicked
lesser number of phishing URLs from January 2014 to April
2014 which shows that training from the landing page helped
users not to fall for phishing attacks. Our analysis shows that
phishers have started to modify their techniques by creating more
legitimate looking URLs and buying large number of domains to
increase their activity. We observed that phishers are exploiting
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
accredited registrars to launch their attacks even after strict
surveillance. We saw that phishers are trying to exploit free
subdomain registration services to carry out attacks. In this paper,
we also compared the phishing e-mails used by phishers to lure
victims in 2008 and 2014. We found that the phishing e-mails
have changed considerably over time. Phishers have adopted
new techniques like sending promotional e-mails and emotionally
targeting users in clicking phishing URLs.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increase in use of Internet for business, finance
and personal investments, threats due to Internet frauds and
eCrime are on rise. Internet frauds can take several forms,
from stealing personal information to conducting fraudulent
transactions. One interesting form of Internet fraud is phish-
ing; Phishing is the act of attempting to acquire sensitive
information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card
details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic
communication [22]. Phishing attacks use e-mail messages and
websites designed to look as if they came from known and
legitimate organizations, in order to deceive people in giving
out their personal, financial or other sensitive information.
A recent report by Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)
showed that second half of 2013 saw a 60% increase in
phishing attacks from the first half [5]. The report also high-
lighted an increase in the number of unique domain names and
maliciously registered domain names for carrying out phishing
attacks. This shows that criminals are exploiting best possible
resources to carry out their tasks effectively. RSA, the security
division at EMC2 recently released their monthly report on
online fraud to show that phishing cost global organizations
$448 million in losses in April 2014. 1
Phishing has become a major concern for Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), with pressure coming from both users who
demand that service providers do more to protect them from
attacks, and from the financial institutions targeted by these
attacks. To reduce phishing damage, stakeholders have enacted
their own countermeasures. ISPs, mail providers, browser
vendors, registrars and law enforcement all play important
roles. Although simple, due to off-the-shelf phishing kits
provided by a thriving cybercrime ecosystem, phishing attacks
can have a remarkable impact on the community. As a re-
sult, the anti-phishing solutions are increasing in number to
reduce these attacks. APWG is an international consortium
focused on eliminating fraud and identity theft that result
from phishing, pharming and email spoofing of all types.
APWG’s Internet Policy Committee (IPC) worked with CyLab
Usable Privacy and Security laboratory (CUPS) at the Carnegie
Mellon University (CMU) in creation of APWG-sponsored
anti-phishing landing page that aimed to educate users against
the implications of phishing and guided them how to avoid it
[27]. The landing page, as shown in Figure 1, was developed
to train users who fell for phishing attacks. It was a substitute
to a non-informative HTTP 404 (page not found) error page
that does not provide any useful information to the end users.
The landing page served as a repository of data that can be
analysed to better understand phishing and its current trends.
In this paper, we analysed two datasets from the landing
page, first from September 2008 - November 2009, and second
from January 2014 - April 2014 which were obtained from
APWG, as Apache 2 redirect logs. This paper describes
an evolutionary study on the two datasets, in two different
timestamps to study phishing trends. Our objective in this
research is to track the evolution of phishing and answer some
questions; what new techniques have phishers incorporated to
carry out their tasks? What are the characteristics of URLs and
domains which are used to carry out these attacks, and what
kind of registrars are being exploited by phishers to launch
1http://www.ciol.com/ciol/resource-center/215305/phishing-cost-global-
organizations-usd448-mn-losses-april-rsa
2http://www.apache.org/
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Fig. 1. APWG sponsored landing page developed at CMU in August 2008
to educate and train users not to fall for phishing attacks.
their attacks? What is the spread (across the globe) of the
victims clicking on these phishing URLs? What are the places
used by phishers in order to spread their phishing URLs?
We received another dataset from APWG in the form of
phishing e-mails reported by users to APWG. Through this
dataset, we were able to determine the reasons that make
them effective in convincing potential victims in giving their
valuable information. We also measured the effectiveness of
the landing page in helping users to avoid falling for phishing
attacks. Our main contributions are:
• We present an evolutionary study on phishing tech-
niques incorporated by phishers by comparing them
from the September 2008 - November 2009 dataset
and January 2014 - April 2014 dataset. We found
that phishers have started to buy more number of
domains, exploiting ICANN accredited registrars, and
free subdomain registration services to launch attacks.
We observed that phishing e-mails changed over time,
with phishers using new techniques like propagation of
promotional and money-related e-mails to con people.
• We measured the effectiveness of educating page to
see if they helped users not to fall for phishing. We
found that 46% users were benefited from the landing
page as the number of phishing URLs they clicked in
April 2014 reduced from January 2014.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we discuss related research work. In Section 3,
we present the infrastructure and framework used for our data
collection from the landing page. In Section 4, we discuss the
results from the landing page deployment. In the last section,
we present the concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Many researchers have examined the statistics of suspicious
URLs to understand what leads to phishing. Mc. Grath et
al. performed a comparative analysis of phishing and non-
phishing URLs [30]. They studied features like IP addresses,
WHOIS records, geographic information, and lexical features
of the URL (length, character distribution, and presence of
predefined brand names) and found different lengths for phish-
ing and non-phishing URLs, misuse of free hosting services
by phishers. Similar features were used by Guan et al. to
classify URLs that appeared in Instant Messaging (IM) [19]
Ma et al. built a URL classication system that processed a
live feed of labelled URLs and collected features (lexical,
WHOIS features) for these URLs in real time [28] with an
accuracy of 99%. Zhang et al. built CANTINA, a tool which
classified phishing URLs by analysing the content of the
webpage [40]. They assigned a weighted sum to 8 features
(4 content-related, 3 lexical, and 1 WHOIS-related) to build
the classifier. Among lexical features, they looked at dots in
the URL, presence of certain characters, presence of IP address
in the URL, and age of the domain. They further developed
8 discriminatory features and proposed CANTINA+ which
explored HTML Document Object Model (DOM) and third
party services to find phishing pages [39]. Miyamoto et al. used
AdaBoost-based detection training sets to determine weights
for the heuristics used in CANTINA and combined them using
AdaBoost algorithm [31]. Fu et al. tried to classify phishing
web pages based on visual similarity [17]. They compared
potential phishing pages against actual pages and assessed
visual similarities between them in terms of key regions, page
layouts, and overall styles.
Blum et al. proposed a method to detect phishing URLs
based on SVM [7]. They used 23 features to train the SVM
based on protocol, domain, and path features of the URL.
They achieved an accuracy of 99%. Fette et al. used machine
learning to classify phishing messages [15]. They used the
properties of URLs present in the message (e.g., the number
of URLs, number of domains, and number of dots in a
URL) and could identify suspicious URLs with 96% accuracy.
Bergholz et al. further improved the accuracy of Fette et al.
by introducing models of text classication to analyse e-mail
content [6]. They trained the e-mail features using Dynamic
Markov Chains and Class - Topic models. Whittaker et al.
analysed URL and contents of the page to determine whether
a page is phishing or not [38]. They used features like presence
of IP address, string characteristics of the URL and could
classify more than 90% phishing pages. Kolari et al. used
URLs found within a blog page as features to determine
whether the page is spam with good accuracy [25]. We used
some URL based features (like number of dots, number of
subdomains in the URL, presence of IP address) and certain
domain related features (information obtained from WHOIS
records) to find the change in URL structure and domain
characteristics in our datasets.
Highlighting the need for anti-phishing solutions, re-
searchers first tried to understand why phishing works, its
economic and psychological impact. Dhamija et al. gave a
psychology based discussion on why people fall for phish-
ing [12]. They analysed 200 phishing attacks and identified
several reasons, ranging from pure lack of computer system
knowledge, to visual deception tricks used by adversaries, due
to which users fall for phishing attacks. They conducted a
usability study to show that people generally don’t look at the
browser based cues like address bar, security indicators etc.
Downs et al. explored the mental models used by the Internet
users to evaluate potential phishing pages [13]. Some of their
subjects used incorrect strategies to analyse potential scams,
leaving them at risk. Fogg et al. studied the attributes of web
pages that make it credible [16]. They found that many features
of a page’s appearance enhance its perceived credibility, a
fact that phishers routinely exploit. Moore et al. gave an eco-
nomic model to characterize the trade-offs between advertising
and malware as monetary vectors providing insights into the
economic impact of phishing attacks [32]. Al-Momani et al.
developed a model to classify e-mails into phishing e-mails
and legitimate e-mails in online mode [2]. Spamassassin was
built with a number of rules to detect features common in
spam e-mail that go beyond the text of the email. 3 Such text
included things like the ratio of pixels occupied by text to
those occupied by images in a rendered version of the e-mail,
presence of certain fake headers, and the like. In our work, we
study the features in phishing e-mails which convinced people
to respond and click them.
Anti-phishing is the countermeasure to defeat phishing.
There are a number of countermeasures proposed to combat
phishing. Kirda et al. developed a browser extension AntiPhish,
that aimed to protect users against spoofed website-based
attacks [24]. Several other toolbars like SpoofGaurd [10],
TrustBar [20], PhishZoo [1], Netcraft [33], and SiteAdvisor
[29] were developed to warn users about phishing attacks.
Dhamija et al. developed “trusted paths” for the Mozilla web
browser that were designed to assist users in verifying that their
browser has made a secure connection to a trusted site [11].
In our work, we see the effectiveness of browser blacklists in
preventing victims not to click phishing links.
Another approach has been to educate and train users about
phishing. Kumaraguru et al. used online training materials
to teach people how to protect themselves from phishing
attacks [27]. Robila et al. educated users using phishing IQ
tests and class discussions [36]. They displayed legitimate
and fraudulent e-mails to users and had them identify the
phishing attempts from authentic e-mails. It helped users in
knowing what to look in the e-mails. Jagatic et al. developed
a contextual training approach in which users sent phishing e-
mails to probe their vulnerability [21]. At the end of the study,
users were typically given additional materials informing them
about phishing attacks in general. This approach had been
used at Indiana University in studies conducted on students
about contextual attacks making use of personal information.
We measure the effectiveness of real-time training provided
by the landing page to help users prevent clicking phishing
URLs.
The network characteristics of spam has been investigated
by spammers. Anderson et al. focussed on the Internet infras-
tructure use to host phishing scams [3]. They found that large
number of hosts are used to advertise Internet scams using
spam campaigns, individual scams themselves are typically
hosted on only one machine. Ramachandran et al. studied
the network level behaviour of spammers, like IP address
ranges that send out the most spam, common spamming
modes, persistence of spamming hosts, and botnet spamming
characteristics [35]. Casado et al. used passive measurements
of packet traces captured from spam sources to estimate the
bottleneck bandwidths of TCP flows from these spam sources
[8]. Jung et al. studied the DNS blacklist traffic to monitor the
IP addresses that were sending out spam. They also observed
the activity distribution of spam source hosts [23]. In our work,
3http://spamassassin.apache.org/
we study the machines (hosting infrastructure) that are used to
host phishing campaigns.
Most of the past work has been done on phishing detection,
building classifiers to predict phishing URLs and e-mails, eco-
nomic impact, phishing trends, network characteristics, anti-
phishing solutions and psychological aspects of phishing. We
built our analysis on the work done by Kumaraguru et al. [27]
and recently generated APWG report [5] to do a longitudinal
study on true positive (close to ground datasets) to understand
the evolution of techniques used by phishers in order to spread
phishing URLs. We used two APWG’s datasets obtained from
phishing landing page, one from September 2008 - November
2009, and other from January 2014 - April 2014, to draw our
comparative analysis. We also study the features of phishing
e-mails that compel users to click on phishing links. In this
paper, we also look at the effectiveness of landing page to help
users prevent themselves not to fall for phishing attacks.
III. INFRASTRUCTURE
APWG and Carnegie Mellon CyLab’s Supporting Trust
Decisions Project launched the Phishing Education Landing
Page Program 4 in August 2008 to educate users about
phishing. The goal of this initiative was to instruct consumers
on online safety at the “most teachable moment” i.e. when
they have just clicked on a link in a phishing communication
[26]. This landing page was hosted on APWG servers and
is now translated into more than 20 languages. Users would
be redirected to the specific language version of the page
depending on the default language of their web browser. The
ISPs, registrars or any other organization who had control of
handling phishing pages were asked to redirect their user base
to the landing page. When an ISP shuts down a phishing
website / page and a user clicks on the link to that page, he
/ she gets to see a “HTTP 404 not found page”. For ISPs
who opted for this initiative, their users were redirected to the
landing page instead of ‘not found’ page. To ensure proper
redirection by the take down vendors, a set of instructions were
furnished in a “how to” file which was available on the website
page. 5 While doing the redirect, the ISPs were suggested to
add the phishing URL as a parameter in the URL requesting
the landing page. This was done by putting the phishing URL
after “?” in the HTTP request to the landing page.
The APWG’s server access log records all the requests
in Apache’s log format. The records were logged in the
following Apache log format: “{%h %l %u %t \“%r\” %s %b
\“%{Referrer}i\” \“%{User-agent}i\”}” i.e., each request
was logged with the originating IP address, date, requesting
URL, success code, size of the request header, and browser /
client information. By mining the landing page log files, we
could create a list of phishing URLs that were redirected to the
landing page. We computed metrics based from these logs and
report results for time period January 1, 2014 - April 30, 2014.
In rest of the paper, we will refer this as 2014 dataset. We also
analysed redirect logs on the landing page from September 7,
2008 - November 11, 2009 to study the evolution of techniques
used by phishers in order to attract maximum victims to the
phishing URLs. We will refer this as 2008 dataset in rest of
the paper. We correlated the data from log files to the phishing
4http://phish-education.apwg.org/r/about.html
5http://phish-education.apwg.org/r/how to.html
e-mail feed archive by APWG to find out which e-mails led
the users to visit the landing page. We studied how successful
the landing page was to help users not to fall for phishing
attacks.
The data collected from the log files does not represent
the entire population of the people clicking on phishing URLs
and e-mails. If a user clicks on a phishing link and the link is
already in the browser blacklists, then he / she will be blocked
by browser settings and will not be redirected to the landing
page. Some take town vendors may stop redirecting users to
the landing page and show them the original ‘HTTP 404 not
found page’. Thus, our data is a good lower bound for people
who clicked on the phishing URLs and e-mails.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the detailed analysis that we
performed to answer our research questions. We discuss the
structure of phishing URLs, insights into the domain used for
creating URLs, geographical spread of victims clicking the
phishing URLs and countries hosting the phishing domains,
learning curve of the users after getting trained from the
landing page, distribution of user agents like Internet Explorer,
Firefox etc. used by the victims while clicking the phishing
URLs, and referrer analysis to get information about the places
used for spreading these links. We also present feature analysis
performed on the e-mails to study the change in phishing e-
mails from 2008 to 2014.
A. Statistics on Apache logs
To analyse results from the logs, we used only the entries
that contained “/r/”, because the entries were created in the logs
when users clicked on links to websites that were taken down.
The entries having “?” in the HTTP request were considered
to include the phishing URL; the vendors were asked to add
user-clicked URL (phishing URL) after a “?” in the HTTP
request which they sent to the landing page. The detailed
architecture of how the landing page works in given in Figure
1 [27]. We removed the entries that contained terms like
‘ORIGINAL PHISH URL’ or ‘www.phishsite.com’ or ‘the-
phishing-page.html.’ These were used in the documentation on
how to implement the landing page and were likely to be hits
from people testing the landing page. To ensure that clicks to
the landing page were received by the end users and not take
down vendors, we considered the URLs having greater than 5
hits in 2014 dataset. After analyzing the frequency distribution
of the hits corresponding to each URL, we found a significant
drop in URLs with 5 hits compared to the ones getting more
than 5 hits. We assume that URLs which appeared in the logs
less than five times were mostly used by take down vendors
or organizations testing their implementation of the landing
page or checking whether the landing page is still active.
Table I presents statistics for the total hits received on the
landing page. There were 3,613,410 total hits on 10,833 unique
URLs redirected to the landing page. For the 2008 dataset, we
considered URLs having hits greater than 5 after looking at the
frequency distribution curve and recorded 2,977,052 total hits
on 21,890 unique URLs. By this, we have kept the hits in both
the analysis to be same, greater than 5.
TABLE I. COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE APWG LANDING PAGE
LOGS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2014 TO APRIL 30, 2014.
Statistics Whole
dataset
<= 5 hits >5 hits
Number of unique
URLs
28,471 17,638 10,833
Total Hits for all
unique URLs
3,646,483 33,073 3,613,410
Maximum number of
hits for a single URL
342,317 5 342,317
Minimum number of
hits for a single URL
1 1 6
Average number of
hits per URL
104.9 1.6 300.2
Median number of hits
per URL
2 1 17
Standard Deviation for
the URLs
3077.2 1.1 5224.5
B. Location Analysis
To find the geographical reach of phishing URLs across
the globe and get an idea about the countries being infected
/ vulnerable to phishing attacks, we fetched the latitude and
longitude information corresponding to each IP address ob-
served in our dataset. We used a public REST API, 6 to get the
geo-location (latitude, longitude) information corresponding to
each unique IP address. Figure 2 shows the distribution of hits
from the countries across the globe on world map. The United
States, France, Germany, Australia were found to be most
vulnerable to phishing attacks. However, the United States
has a large Internet penetration rate, so to find the percentage
of users who were vulnerable to phishing attacks in each
of these countries, we divided the number of clicks with its
respective Internet population. 7 Figure 3 shows the normalized
distribution of clicks for 168 unique countries found in the
2014 dataset. We found that countries like Austria, France,
Europe had higher percentage of Internet users falling for
phishing attacks. In 2008 dataset, we received clicks from 167
unique countries where the top 5 maximum hits were received
from Peru, the United States, Venezuela, Argentina, and Japan.
Fig. 2. Location information for the clicks obtained in 2014 dataset, shows
that the United States is most vulnerable to phishing attacks, followed by
France and Germany.
Over recent years, there has been greater emphasis on
using local language of the target audience. For example,
6http://freegeoip.net/
7http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/rank.php
phishers construct their e-mails using the appropriate language
for the target audience. 8 To see if phishers incorporated similar
technique, we studied if there exists any correlation between
the location from where user clicked the phishing URL and
the language in which the landing page was displayed. For
example, the page was requested in Arabic for people who
belonged to countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and the like. We looked for the countries and
the languages in which they were redirected, and compared
each country with the list of its official languages as provided
on Wikipedia. 9 We searched the requested URL for two
character language code (e.g., ‘en’ for English) to find out the
language in which the landing page was requested. We found
11 unique languages in the dataset; Arabic, Dutch, English,
French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian,
Russian, and Spanish. We found that all languages except
English had users from those parts of the world where the
particular language was the official language. For English,
however, we received clicks from nearly all parts of the world.
Fig. 3. Location information for the clicks obtained in 2014 dataset,
normalized for different Internet population; shows that Austrians have been
the most gullible followed by French and Germans.
C. URL Analysis
In a URL based phishing attack, an adversary
lures the victim into clicking a URL pointing to the
phishing site. Typical phishing URLs have the following
structure, http://domain.TLD/directory/filename?query-string.
The directory specifies the path with the file which is passed
with a query string, together forming the pathname of the
URL. The adversary usually obfuscates the URLs using
several methods. We discuss some of the techniques currently
in use.
(i) IP address obfuscation: For a web browser to
communicate over the Internet, the domain address must
be resolved to an IP address. This resolution of IP address
to host name is achieved through domain name servers. A
phisher may wish to use the IP address as part of a URL
to obfuscate the host and possibly bypass content filtering
systems, or hide the destination from the end user. 10 Garera
et al. showed that the blacklist URLs generally have a
significant percentage of IP address in the URL pathname
[18]. We used regular expression to check the presence of an
IP address in a phishing URL in our dataset. We did not find
significant difference in presence of such URLs in 2008 and
8http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/iss/pdf/phishing-guide-wp.pdf
9http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of official languages
10http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/iss/pdf/phishing-guide-wp.pdf
2014 datasets. This shows that the number of attacks using
IPs remained steady. As phishing attacks are becoming more
sophisticated, IP-based links are becoming less prevalent, and
attackers are buying domain names to make their URL look
more genuine and legitimate.
(ii) Directory structure similarity: As pointed out by
Prakash et al., there is a good chance that phishing URLs
share a common directory structure, but with different
filename or query string [34]. This helps phishers to launch
different kind of phishing URLs keeping the directory
structure same. We maintained a path equivalence class in
which URLs with similar directory structure were grouped
together. The URL was parsed for each ‘/’ and string matching
algorithm was used to compare the directories. We found that
38% of phishing URLs in the 2014 dataset had the same
directory structure with either different domains or different
query string in the end to add variations. This is higher than
18% observed in our 2008 dataset. This could be possible if
phishers use single machine to launch multiple URLs or share
common public directory in a network to carry out attacks.
(iii) Number of host components in phishing URL:
Phishers normally use a long hostname, to confuse
viewers into believing that their webpage is legitimate.
They try to append an authentic-sounding word to
their domain name. For eg., appleid.apple.co.uk.cgi-
bin.webobjects.myappleid.woa.verify.appleid-serv.co.uk.
This is easy to detect automatically by counting the number
of host segments before the domain (9 in this case). Whittaker
et al. showed that URLs where the number of host components
is greater than 3 are generally phishing pages [38]. Our 2014
dataset had 17.4% URLs having length greater than 3
compared to 7.8% observed in 2008 dataset. This shows that
phishers have started using more sophisticated techniques than
that were used earlier to compel users in clicking phishing
URLs.
We analysed how phishers propagated their phishing
campaigns by dividing our 2014 dataset into 17 weeks. We
plotted total number of unique URLs and unique IP hits
observed per week. We assumed that each unique IP address
corresponds to a unique user. Our results would have been
more accurate if we would have obtained information about
the users from the take down vendors. As shown in Figure
4, the number of IP hits (victims) were always found to
be greater than the number of URLs which indicates that
phishers were successful in luring their victims. To analyse
the peak observed in the third week, we calculated the ratio
of URLs to victims for each day in that particular week. We
found that more than 90% victims were captured on January
19, 2014. Next, we looked at the geographical distribution of
these victims; majority were found from Germany, Austria
and the United States (the most vulnerable countries as
discussed in the previous section). We further looked at the
top 10 URLs which received maximum clicks in our 2014
dataset; we observed that these URLs had highest number of
victims from Germany and followed a particular format i.e.,
string1.string2.com/telekom and string1/vodafone online/.
This outrage was a result of the malicious campaign which
included e-mails that masqueraded as bills from NTTCable
and from VolksbankU. 11 The malware that started on January
5, 2014, recorded the largest number of attacks in Germany.
We observed a drop in thirteenth week due to some technical
issues with the APWG servers, as a result of which the
redirect requests could not be logged for that week.
Fig. 4. Analysis of phishing campaigns during January 2014 - April 2014,
by plotting the number of distinct URLs and IP hits per week (17 weeks).
Phishing campaigns were found to be always successful since the number of
URLs always exceeded the number of victims falling for it.
To check correlation between a URL’s geographical spread
and its lifetime (days between first and last click during the
period 01/ 01/ 2014 - 30/ 04/ 2014), we plotted Figure 5.
Each point is a URL whose x and y is determined by its
lifetime and geographical spread respectively. Figure 5(a)
showed that large percentage of URLs received lowest number
of clicks, spanned across lesser number of countries, and
remained active for a longer duration. Figure 5(e) showed
that few URLs that received highest clicks, spread across
larger number of countries, and had an average lifetime.
URLs receiving intermediate number of clicks spread evenly,
geographically and temporally as shown in Figure 5(b), 5(c),
and 5(d).
To measure the effectiveness of landing page in helping
people not to fall for phishing attacks, we analysed the unique
users (IP address) who were found in our dataset both in
the months of January and April 2014 to observe their click
stream. Figure 6(a) shows the learning curve for all such users
where the x-axis represents 3,359 unique users and y-axis
shows the difference in the number of URL hits a user made
in April 2014 than in January 2014. We observed that 46%
users had lesser number of hits in April than in January 2014
which showed that the landing page was effective in helping
users in guiding them not to fall for phishing attacks. With the
difference in URL hits calculated as above, Figure 6(b) shows
the distribution of users whose difference in number of URL
hits ranged from -500 to 500. We saw that a large proportion
of users clicked lesser number of URLs from January to April
2014, whereas less number of users clicked more URLs in
April than in January 2014.
D. Domain Analysis
We parsed phishing URLs to get the corresponding domain
from our datasets. We found 320 unique domains in 2008
dataset and 1,893 in 2014 dataset. We then performed WHOIS
11http://blogs.cisco.com/security/fake-phone-bills-contain-malware-
targeting-dt-customers/
12 lookups to collect information for each unique domain.
We got information like the creation date, registrar name,
and the information that a registrant enters while creating /
registering a domain in his / her name like his / her name,
location (street, city, state, country), email, and telephone.
For each domain, we used Geolocation API, 13 to get access
to the geographical location information of machines hosting
the phishing domains. It gave information like IP address of
the domain, location (latitude, longitude, city, region, country)
where the domain is hosted, ISP information of the particular
IP address / domain. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the
countries hosting the domains for 2014 dataset. We show
only the top 9 countries hosting the domains, since others
had less than 1% share of hosting domains. The United
States was observed to be the top-most country hosting the
phishing domains. This is because a large percentage of the
World’s popular registrars / hosts like Godaddy.com, eNom,
WildWestDomain.com etc. are hosted in the United States. 14
In 2008 dataset, countries like Hungary, France, Belarus, and
Australia were found to host maximum number of phishing
domains after the United States.
Fig. 7. Distribution of top nine countries hosting phishing domains in 2014
dataset. The United States is observed to host maximum number of phishing
domains.
We found 35% of the phishing domains hosted on a single
server (same IP address) maintained by FreeDNS, a service
operational in the United States, 15 which allows people to
share their domain with others, and similarly use other’s
domains. It allows anyone to add multiple subdomains off
a primary domain till the owner of that domain specifically
disallows it. Such kind of “subdomain registration services”
offer users a “domain name” – their own DNS space – and
often offer free DNS management. As a result, it affects the
innocent users as well whose domains can be exploited by the
phishers in carrying out their attacks. APWG reported a similar
service operational in Netherlands [5]. Use of subdomain
services continues to be a challenge for ISPs tracking down the
phishing URLs, because many of these services are free, offer
anonymous registration, and only the subdomain providers
themselves can effectively mitigate the phishing attacks.
We parsed the domains to get the Top Level Domain (TLD)
12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whois
13http://ip-api.com/
14http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/tophosts/global/
15http://freedns.afraid.org/
(a) Number of clicks less than 500. (b) Number of clicks between 500 and 1500. (c) Number of clicks between 1500 and 5,000.
(d) Number of clicks between 5,000 and 10,000. (e) Number of clicks greater than 10,000.
Fig. 5. Scatter plot of phishing URL for geographical and temporal spread as observed in 2014 dataset. It shows that URLs having moderate number of clicks
spread evenly, geographically and temporally. URLs which receive lowest clicks remain active for longer duration and spread across lesser countries, while
URLs with highest clicks span greater number of countries and have average lifetime.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Scatter plot to show the difference in the URL hits of users in April and January 2014. (a) IP hits difference for 3,359 unique users dropped in April than
in January 2014 which shows the success of landing page in training the users to avoid falling for phishing attacks; (b) Distribution of users whose difference
in the number of clicks in January and April 2014 ranged from -500 to 500. We see large number of users with lesser clicks and few users with large number
of clicks in April 2014.
corresponding to each unique domain. Primarily, the choice of
TLD depends upon a number of factors such as the nature of
the website, type of business, location of the business, targeted
audience, sought after territory, type of organization, and the
like. The distribution of TLDs observed in our dataset having
frequency greater than 20 (arranged in increasing order) is
shown in Figure 8. ‘.org’ was the most popular TLD in 2008
since any person / entity was allowed to register for it. 16
With time, ‘.com’ has become the main TLD for domain
names, since many people believe that if net surfers do not
remember the extension, they are more likely to type .com
in front of the domain name. 17 We found TLDs like .au,
.de, .us and various other country code TLDs (ccTLD) in our
dataset, that are geographically specific and can be obtained
at cheaper annual subscriptions compared to that of generic
TLDs. However, their percentage remained low since phishers
want to reach to larger population which could be achieved
through popular domains.
16http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Internet top-level domains
17http://www.pcnames.com/Articles/Common-TLDs-and-Their-Uses
Domain names today can be registered through different
companies, which compete with one another on the basis
of price, value-added services and customer service. ICANN
coordinates the Internet’s global domain name system and
maintains a list of accredited domain name registrars. 18 These
registrars are associated with ICANN with certain rules and
regulations, and applicable laws. We compared this list with the
registrars recorded in our dataset and show the top 20 registrars
in Figure 9(a). However, there are some registrars who do
not register themselves under ICANN. This could be done
to prevent their activities from being monitored and escape
from the annual fee subscription charged by ICANN. The
top 20 non-ICANN accredited registrars found in our dataset
are shown in Figure 9(b). We found that 75.6% registrars
were accredited to ICANN which accounted for 85.6% of the
total URLs clicks in our 2014 dataset. About 55% ICANN
accredited registrars were found in 2008 dataset. The increase
in use of ICANN accredited registrars by phishers shows that
these accredited registrars are not properly monitoring the
18http://www.internic.net/alpha.html
Fig. 8. Distribution of Top Level Domain (TLD) for phishing domains
observed in 2008 and 2014 datasets having frequency of occurrence greater
than 20. ‘.org’ is found to be the popular choice amongst phishers now to
spread phishing.
domains registered under them and are hence being exploited
by the phishers to carry out their spamming activities. Phishers
impersonate as a domain name registrar and try to get access
to registrants’s domain account credentials. 19 This shows the
impending need of proper surveillance to keep criminals out
of such activities.
Next, we saw phishing “uptime” / “live” time, i.e. the
time until phishing attacks remained active [5]. To analyse
this, we plotted the domain creation dates, obtained from
WHOIS lookup, as shown in Figure 10. We observed that
domains registered for the purpose of phishing became active
almost immediately upon registration, as some of the phishing
domains recorded in 2014 dataset were created in 2014. At the
same time, we saw that ISPs have developed good techniques
/ learning to mitigate phishing attacks since they could detect
the domains even when the window to track suspicious domain
registrations from the perspective of phishing was very small.
This shows that the phishing uptime has reduced. APWG
reported that average phishing uptime has reduced to 8 hours
in later half of 2013 [5] from 20 hours as observed in 2008
[4]. It would have been possible for us to calculate the exact
phishing time as observed in 2014, if we would have the
information from ISPs about when the phishing website was
observed first for attack. We also found that the proportion
of domains created in 2014 is more than what was observed
in 2008 dataset. It shows that phishers have started to create
greater number of domains to keep their activity continuous
for longer duration.
E. Browser Analysis
We parsed the browser / client information logged in
redirect logs to analyse the distribution of different user agents
used by victims at the time of attack and to study the effective-
ness of blacklists in controlling phishing attacks today. Web
browsers have free add-ons (or “plugins”) that can help people
detect phishing sites by giving warnings. We used User Agent
19https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-028-en.pdf
Fig. 10. Frequency distribution of phishing domains created per year for
2008 and 2014 datasets. We see a jump in the number of domains created
now than earlier to spread phishing for longer durations.
Parser API, 20 which gave information regarding the client
(victim) software type (browser, crawler, web browser etc.),
Operating System (OS) used by the client (victim). Figure 11
shows the distribution of various type of agents used by the
victims. We see that 60% of user hits come from web browsers,
even after having built-in plugins.
Fig. 11. Distribution of different types of user agents associated with the
victims as observed in 2014 dataset. People are falling for phishing even while
accessing their mobile phones.
Table II shows the information of top 5 browsers and
top 5 crawlers having the highest frequency of occurrence
recorded in our dataset. Though Internet Explorer and Mozilla
Firefox have plugins to detect blacklisted URLs, these were
the most used user agents when victims clicked the phishing
URLs. Researchers have shown that browser blacklists are not
efficient enough to detect the phishing URLs [14] [37]. We
observed similar trends in our 2014 dataset.
TABLE II. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF TOP 5 BROWSER AGENTS
AND CRAWLERS AS OBSERVED IN 2014 dataset. INTERNET EXPLORER AND
FIREFOX ARE OBSERVED TO GET MAXIMUM CLICKS EVEN THOUGH THEY
HAVE BLACKLISTS INSTALLED. THIS SHOWS THAT BLACKLISTS TODAY
ARE NOT VERY EFFECTIVE IN DETECTING PHISHING LINKS.
Browser (60%) Frequency Crawler
(23%)
Frequency
Internet
Explorer
40% Bingbot 25.9%
Firefox 19.8% Java 21.4%
Google
Chrome
14.3% Ezooms 18.3%
Safari 7.2% Baidu Spider 8.2%
Opera 3% Googlebot 7.5%
20http://www.useragentstring.com/pages/api.php
(a) (b)
Fig. 9. Frequency distribution of registrars used by phishers to register their domains as observed in 2014 dataset. (a) Top 20 ICANN accredited registrar; (b)
Top 20 non-ICANN accredited registrar.
While looking at various agents as obtained in the client
/ browser field from the redirect logs, we found suspicious
activity with some of the IP addresses. They were identified
as crawlers (Googlebot, BaiduSpider, MSN bot, Java crawler
etc.) by the user agent string API that we used. These crawlers
ran scripts (bots) to increase the number of redirection to the
landing page. We identified 2,110 such unique IP addresses.
Variants had consecutive numbers in either of the 3 subnets of
the IP address with the first subnet being common. (For exam-
ple, if one of the address IP address was 157.55.XXX.XXX,
another one found was 157.54.XXX.XXX). There is a high
possibility that they belonged to a common network. Majorly,
these IP addresses were found from the United States, China,
Japan, and Russia. Table III shows the information about top
5 IP addresses (in terms of their frequency) that were recorded
in the dataset.
TABLE III. INFORMATION REGARDING THE CRAWLERS AS OBSERVED
IN 2014 dataset. WE SEE THAT PHISHERS USED SCRIPTS TO INCREASE THE
NUMBER OF REDIRECTIONS TO THE LANDING PAGE.
IP address format Country Agent type
157.55.XXX.XXX Unites
States
Bingbot
180.76.XXX.XXX China Baiduspider
199.30.XXX.XXX United
States
MSN bot
123.125.XXX.XXX China Baiduspider
176.195.XXX.XXX Russia Googlebot
Around 83% of IP addresses which ran such scripts did
not have any URL in their request header to the landing
page. These IP addresses could be possibly some phishing kits
that had linked content (like images and text) to their script
from the original landing page and are hence redirected to
the landing page. However, its difficult to draw a conclusive
opinion until and unless we get some information about the IP
address of phishing kits from the ISPs.
F. Referrer Analysis
To look at the breeding zones i.e., the actual places that
were actively used by phishers to spread their phishing links,
we analysed the referrer information available from the redirect
logs. Referrer is the web page or application that contains the
link to web page pointed by the phishing URL. We aggregated
the referrer clicks by grouping all the unique referrers together
and listed them in Table IV.
TABLE IV. TOP 10 REFERRERS OF PHISHING URLS BASED ON THE
NUMBER OF CLICKS AS OBSERVED IN 2014 dataset. WE SEE THAT
PHISHERS ARE TARGETING ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA TO SPREAD PHISHING
URLS.
Referrer Clicks
http://www.google.com 980
http://m.facebook.com 670
http://fasebook.c0m.at 640
http://www.facebook.com 550
http://www.clixsense.com 220
http://www.youtube.com 181
http://servinox.com.co 132
http://www.akihabarashop.jp 130
http://dflogins.1s.fr 91
http://www.google.ro 90
As observed in 2008 dataset, phishers used various adver-
tising and blogging websites to spread phishing URLs. Web-
sites like http://www.12gbfree.com/, http://cache.phazedll.com,
where users could post / search advertisements; blogging
site like http://tipp-pez.blogspot.com/ were found to receive
maximum clicks in the dataset. From the table, however, we
see that phishers have shifted their target to online social
media like Facebook and YouTube to propagate their phishing
links. Similar results were obtained by Chhabra et al. in
2011 [9]. We also observed search engines like google.com,
yandex.com, and bing.com in our dataset which received high
referrer clicks. Several country specific versions of Google
like google.com.au, google.com.uk, google.com.de etc. were
also recorded in the dataset. This might be possible because
users tried to search more information about the phishing
URLs on these search engines and hence were redirected to
the landing page from there. The referrer having the third
highest click, http://fasebook.c0m.at, was built on an illegal
phishing domain, c0m.at, registered in France. We could not
collect much information on it since it was de-activated by
the hosting service. 21 We also observed landing page as
referrer string in the dataset, http://phish-education.apwg.org/
and education.apwg.org without containing any URL in the
requesting header. These referrer could be present because of
two reasons, (i) if the user clicked on some image available on
the landing page and hence got redirected to the same page,
or (ii) the phisher might have linked the text / image from
the landing page to its fake website. In this case, when the
21http://whois.venez.fr/whois.fr.html?name=fasebook&domain=c0m.at
user’s web browser is loaded, the images are loaded from the
actual server and the fake website is logged as a referrer in
the original server’s access log records. 22 However, since these
referrers did not contain any URL (phishing), they were not
considered in our analysis.
G. E-mail feature Analysis
We received phishing e-mails from APWG where people /
organizations / vendors reported the phishing e-mail to them. 23
To study features of the e-mail that contained URLs being
redirected to the landing page, we compared set of domains
corresponding to URLs in the e-mail feed, and in our redirect
logs. We searched the APWG e-mail feed for e-mails contain-
ing the URLs, parsed them to get corresponding domains and
fetched the e-mails containing the common domains. This was
done to analyse features in the e-mails that led victims to click
the phishing URL. We found 170 matches in our log data and
in the APWG feed for 2014 dataset. We manually examined
these e-mails and analysed the features in these e-mails. Some
e-mails were present in different language. We used Google
translate 24 to decode these e-mails. To study the change in
techniques employed by phishers to send phishing e-mails, we
compared the features obtained in our 2014 phishing e-mails
dataset to those reported by Kumaraguru et al., who analysed
the e-mail features in 2008 from the redirect logs of the same
landing page [27].
Most of the e-mails had logos and banners to look more
legitimate. As Dhamija et al showed [12], the fact that these
logos and banners look legitimate is the main reason people
fall for phishing e-mails. We found that phishing scammers are
using e-mail address to promote their fraud and scam. Around
25% e-mails were found to target popular organizations like
Microsoft, Paypal, Instagram etc. Phishers pretended to belong
to these organizations and told users that their accounts were at
risk and they need to upgrade / verify it. The subject line often
had urgent and compelling words like “Upgrade your account”,
“Your online Banking Account is Locked - ACT NOW!”,
“Suspicious activity found - IMPORTANT”. The body of the
e-mail had the link to upgrade the account where they were
asked to give their e-mail and password. Figure 12 represents
the tag cloud of top 100 frequently occurring words found in
the body of phishing e-mail dataset. We found the dominance
of keywords like account, information, bank, microsoft, update
etc. This shows the presence of financial fraud in phishing e-
mails. Some of the messages also had malicious attachment
which the user had to download in order to update their details.
All the e-mails mentioned that the account would be locked
or shut down if the recipient failed to act within the given
time frame. Around 80% e-mails gave a deadline of 24 - 48
hours for the user to act on. One common message that was
observed in the message regarding the timeline was “Your
account has been compromised. Please update it else it will be
closed within 24 hours”. Kumaraguru et al. reported majority
of such e-mails in 2008 [27].
Phishers have brought change in their techniques to lure
more users in their trap as compared to 2008. Around 26% e-
mails were used as promotional e-mails where phishers showed
22http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/quotrefererquot-field-used-
battle-against-online-fraud
23http://www.apwg.org/report-phishing/
24https://translate.google.co.in/
Fig. 12. Tag cloud of top 100 frequently occurring words as observed in the
body of phishing e-mails archive for January - April 2014.
some attractive offers, deals of the day, business proposals,
Facebook page recommendations, YouTube links etc. to make
people fall prey to their attacks. They tried to motivate people
by saying that they could get heavy discounts if they were
first to click on the link. These messages often contained
several links where the users were required to click to get
more information. These were actually pointing to phishing
links. Strong subject lines like “UNBELIEVABLE Check
inside”, “Interesting Stuff” were used to convince people to
click the suspicious links. Some of the e-mails tried to lure
victims by giving them monetary benefits. We observed two
kind of e-mails related to financial relief, (i) 11% of the e-
mails tried to fool users by telling them that their e-mail was
chosen (random) to win a cash prize of X amount. The prize
quoted was high enough to sway them to open and respond
to the e-mail. We observed keywords like million, dollar, usd,
fund etc. in the tag cloud for top 100 words in phishing e-
mails (Figure 12). Users were asked to click a link to redeem
the offer which was actually a phishing link, (ii) Another kind
of e-mail (9%) that we observed was, phishers tried to play
with the emotional sentiments of people to convince them to
click their fraudulent links. The subject line was often read
as “Please help me”, where phishers tried to build stories like
“My X relative died, I want to transfer my money to your
country. Please help me by giving your bank details”. Here,
phishers tried to portray as really helpless and urged people to
respond and help.
We also found around 8% e-mails which were random
requests to add people on network. People sent their pictures,
links (suspicious), videos asking users to know more about
them and connect to them. These links were actually linking
to the phishing sites. We found that majority (75%) of such
e-mails contained derogatory words and grammatical errors in
the message content. Our phishing e-mail archive feed for 2014
also recorded 6% e-mails that contained message like “Your
order is shipped. Click here for more details”. The e-mail body
had the details of the product and users were asked to confirm
their order by clicking the link given in the e-mail. Phishers
targeted popular online shopping sites like Amazon, ebay etc.
This shows that phishers are trying to target users emo-
tionally and financially to make their phishing campaigns
successful. However, some of the strategies to con people to
fall for phishing remained the same as observed in 2008, like
pretending as a popular financial institution and compelling
them to click the URL given in the e-mail to keep their
accounts updated.
H. Observations
In this section, we discuss some of the observations that
we obtained from 2014 dataset. As shortened URLs are
extensively used in online social media to carry out phishing
attacks [9], we looked for the presence of shortened URLs in
our 2014 dataset. APWG reported an increase in use of URL
shortening services in later half of 2013 from the first half.
The list of URL shortening services found in our 2014 dataset
as shown in Table V, however, shows a decline in the use of
these services by phishers. We used Bitly API 25 to check if
the long URL was shortened by Bitly or not. The API gives a
hash value corresponding to the URL. It returns a value ‘0’ if
the URL is already shortened and ‘1’ if it is shortened for the
first time. We queried all unique URLs in the dataset to find
their hash values. For the rest of the services, we checked if
the URL contained the string (shortening service) or not. This
is because these services do not provide an API to check if
the URL is already shortened or not.
TABLE V. URL SHORTENING SERVICES AS OBSERVED IN 2014 dataset.
WE OBSERVED A DECLINE IN USE OF URL SHORTENING SERVICES.
URL
shortening
services
% of URLs
shortened
Bit.do 2%
Bit.ly 1.1%
Goo.gl 0.7%
Tiny.cc 0.03%
Youtu.be 0.02%
short.ie 0.01%
The decrease in the use of URL shortening services could be
because people might have lost faith in these URL shortening
services and hence phishers are discontinuing to use them.
We analysed number of domains which are malicious in our
2014 dataset. For this, we looked at the domains marked ma-
licious by VirusTotal and SURBL. VirusTotal is a free online
service that characterize a URL / domain as malicious using
52 different website / domain scanning engines and datasets.26
SURBL is an aggregated list of websites that have appeared in
unsolicited messages. 27 Both these services provide an API
to check whether the URL / domain is malicious or not. We
queried all the unique domains against these two services and
found 12.5% domains were registered malicious on VirusTotal,
and 3% on SURBL. This shows that these services are not
prudent enough to detect malicious / bad domains.
V. CONCLUSION
Our preliminary analysis shows the change in techniques
incorporated by phishers to launch attacks. We saw that
phishers are improving their techniques by making their URLs
look more genuine and legitimate to convince people to click
on them. They prepend authentic-sounding words with the
domains in the URL to convince people that it’s genuine.
25http://dev.bitly.com/links.html#v3 shorten
26https://www.virustotal.com/en/about/credits/
27http://www.surbl.org/
Phishers have also increased the numbers of phishing domains
registered per year to keep propagating their activities for
longer duration. We observed that majority of registrars were
accredited under ICANN which is bound under proper rules
and regulations. However, the ability of phishers to attack
them shows the impending need of proper surveillance to
decrease criminal activities. We found that many country
specific domains (low cost) are created which aim to target
local population. But, the number of such domains remain low
since phishers want to capture larger proportion of people by
using international domains.
We saw that browser blacklists today are not able to detect
the phishing links. Internet Explorer and Firefox, though have
several built-in plugins to detect phishing sites, we found large
number of such user agents when victims clicked the phishing
URLs. We observed that phishers have shifted their focus from
advertising and blogging websites and are now targeting social
media to spread their phishing links. We also saw change in
phishing e-mails used to con people in clicking phishing URLs.
Phishers have come up with some new techniques like sending
promotional and monetary-related e-mails to lure victims to
give out their personal information. Besides, some phishing e-
mails have not changed considerably with time, largely asking
victims to click on links (phishing) to upgrade their account.
We also observed the effectiveness of landing page in helping
people to avoid falling for phishing attacks. Forty six percent
users clicked lesser number of phishing URLs in April than in
January 2014, which shows the landing page was successful
in helping and guiding them not to fall for phishing attacks.
Our results will help ISPs and other financial / government
organizations to enhance their techniques to detect phishing
URLs. As we found that phishers are evolving their techniques
to construct a phishing URL, take down vendors can bring
change in their methodology to mark a website as phishing and
take it down. ICANN accredited registrars can build stricter
policies to mitigate the unauthorized use of their services by
phishers. Our results showed that users are learning from the
landing page, we believe, it will benefit a larger population if
more ISPs adopt this initiative and redirect their users to the
landing page.
For this paper, we only had access to logs and e-mails,
so we don’t have any information available about the users
arriving at the landing page. It would be interesting to study
the behavioral patterns of these users to know what preempted
them to click these links. It would have been possible for us
to do a detailed analysis on phishing kits used in 2014, if we
would have more information about them like IP address, type
etc. Since the phishing sites were already being redirected to
the landing page, we could not analyse the contents of these
websites to see in what respect they looked different from the
legitimate sites. It restricted us to analyse the features and
patterns of these phishing sites that prompted ISPs and take
down vendors to mark a website as phishing, and hence bring
it down. It would be interesting to do a longitudinal study
on the dataset available from 2008 (when the landing page
was deployed) to 2014, to reveal emerging phishing patterns.
Even though several classifiers are built to classify phishing
and non-phishing URLs, people still fall for phishing attacks.
We plan to extend this analysis to generate features that could
help in building a plugin / service to predict phishing and non-
phishing URLs on the fly, and help users not to click phishing
URLs.
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